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SILENCING THE SHAREHOLDERS' VOICE
THOMAS LEE HAZEN*
In this essay Professor Hazen discusses recent limitations on
shareholders' participation in corporate governance. First,
limiting shareholders' ability to convene a shareholder meeting
deprives them of a significant corporate governance right. Second,
permitting holders of a majority of the shares to act by consent in
lieu of a meeting eliminates the opportunity for discourse and
debate. Professor Hazen makes the point that an amendment to
the articles of incorporation to permit shareholder action by
majority consent triggers the statutory appraisal remedy for
dissenting shareholders. Finally, Professor Hazen objects to the
legislature's propensity to respond to certain private interests
rather than balance the competing interests involved in corporate
governance issues.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1897
I. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE ............................................................................ 1898
II. NORTH CAROLINA TRADITIONS ............................................. 1903
III. THE EROSION OF SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN THE
NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT .............. 1908
A. Eliminating Shareholder Initiative-Law for Sale ........... 1908
B. Shareholder Action Without a Meeting ............................. 1916
1. The Appraisal Remedy ........................................... 1918
2. Basic Fairness ........................................................... 1922
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 1926
INTRODUCTION
This essay has a dual purpose. First, as a policy matter, I bemoan
the decreasing role of shareholders in the governance of corporations
organized under the North Carolina Business Corporation Act.'
* Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill. B.A., 1969, Columbia University; J.D., 1972, Columbia Law School.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55 (2001).
A long-standing rule in this country has been that the internal affairs of
corporations are governed by the law of the state of incorporation, regardless of where the
corporation does business. Accordingly, this essay discusses only those corporations that
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Second, I criticize the North Carolina legislature2 for enacting
provisions of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act3 that,
although perhaps beneficial in some particular instances, do not favor
the best interests of most North Carolina companies and their
shareholders. This is especially troubling because, as observed in the
leading treatise on North Carolina corporate law, "[tihe North
Carolina corporation law has been notable for its strong protection of
shareholder rights."4 This observation was made just one year before
the legislature's recent dilution of shareholder rights that prompted
this essay. If the legislature continues on its current route, this and
other parts of the rich tradition of North Carolina corporate law5 will
have yielded to considerations of expediency to satisfy powerful
lobbying efforts.
I. THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The corporate form of doing business did not exist at common
law; it is purely a creature of statute.6 The legislature defines the
parameters of corporate existence. An important part of the
legislature's role is establishing a system of governance within the
corporate enterprise. This entails defining the respective roles of the
various constituencies-specifically shareholders and management.
Undoubtedly, the state's economy is affected by corporate
conduct 7 and, therefore, the legislature has valid concerns in trying to
protect the welfare of the state and its citizens. On the other hand,
are incorporated in North Carolina or under the laws of other states having substantially
similar statutory provisions.
2. Strictly speaking, the Governor of North Carolina must share some of the blame
for not vetoing the bill. However, to say the least, a veto would have been an unusual,
albeit courageous, course to follow in light of the way in which the General Assembly
passed the legislation.
3. North Carolina Business Corporation Act, ch. 1371, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432
(superceded by Act of June 8, 1989, ch. 265, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 566 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN .STAT. §§ 55-17-05 (2001))).
4. RUSSELL M. ROBINSON II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW § 14.01(b), at 14-3 (6th ed. 2000).
5. See infra notes 24-48 and accompanying text (recounting the history of North
Carolina's corporate law).
6. See generally 1 JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS LEE HAZEN & F. HODGE O'NEAL,
CORPORATIONS §§ 2.2-2.4 (2002) (discussing the evolution of English and American
corporate law).
7. Consider, for example, the effects of the departure of Piedmont Airlines and R.J.
Reynolds corporate headquarters from Winston-Salem, North Carolina-both due to
acquisitions. Any time a locality loses major corporate employers, the resulting layoffs
adversely impact the local economy. Another adverse impact is the elimination of "big
spenders" from the local economy.
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maintaining a balanced state corporate law with integrity is another
valid concern. Tens or even hundreds of thousands of businesses are
incorporated under a state's corporate law. A state's corporate law
regulates conduct affecting all of these business enterprises. In
establishing corporate governance norms, the legislature should focus
on the corporate community generally and also upon the public
policies implicated in corporate governance. The corporate relation
involves protection of investors as well as management. History8
reveals that legislatures design corporate law to regulate corporate
power that otherwise might place the economic interests of a few
ahead of the general welfare of the state and its citizens.9
Legislative intervention in corporate governance is not a new
phenomenon. This intervention is especially visible when a
corporation asks the legislature to intervene to prevent a corporate
takeover that threatens jobs within the state.10  Although job
retention in the state is an important goal, the legislature should not
intervene at the expense of North Carolina's system of corporate
governance. Such intervention should be avoided particularly at a
time when legislatures have been embarking on the unfortunate
course of silencing the shareholders' voice.
8. This history dates back to the 18th century and the infamous South Sea Bubble
that resulted in significant corporate legislation in England. See ARMAND BUDINGTON
DUBoIs, THE ENGLISH BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BUBBLE ACT 1720-1800 1-3
(1938) (reciting the history of corporate legislation up to the Bubble Act); 7(2)
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, COMPANIES § 1739 (4th ed. 1973) (discussing the
amendments made by the Insolvency Act).
9. See generally 1 COX, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 6, §§ 2.2-2.5 (discussing the
evolution of corporate law).
10. Recent North Carolina examples include the First Union amendments, as well as a
threatened takeover of Burlington Industries in the 1980s. To repel the attempted
takeover, the North Carolina legislature was asked to enact protective legislation. Since
Burlington Industries was not a North Carolina corporation, the legislature could not
simply amend the rules applicable to North Carolina corporations, as was done more
recently in response to the SunTrust bid for Wachovia. Instead, legislation was introduced
to amend the North Carolina takeover legislation to apply to any corporation having at
least 50% of its assets in the state. Burlington Industries did not meet this threshold,
however, so the proposal was rewritten and enacted with a 40% threshold. Shareholder
Protection Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9-01 to 55-9-05 (2001) (setting out North
Carolina's version of a "fair price" statute which has the effect of preceding two tiered,
front-end loaded tender offers); Control Share Acquisitions Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-
9A-01 to 55-9A-09 (2001) (conditioning voting rights of a person acquiring a control block
of shares upon approval by holders of a majority of the disinterested shares); Thomas Lee
Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third Generations, 23 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 77, 85-88 (1988) [hereinafter Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation]
(discussing North Carolina's adoption of anti-takeover legislation in 1987 and the states
that followed North Carolina's example).
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Shareholders are the owners of the corporate enterprise. As the
risk takers, they stand to gain from the success of the business. At the
same time, they stand to lose their investment if the enterprise fails.
Because of the shareholders' stake in the business, corporate law has
vested ultimate control of the corporation in the shareholders. This
essay examines two amendments to North Carolina's corporate law
enacted in 2001 that unduly restrict the shareholders' role in
determining the future of their corporation. First, the legislature
enacted a provision permitting shareholder action without a
shareholder meeting. In effect, this provision silences the
shareholders' voice and destroys their opportunity to openly debate
the issues before a vote is taken. Second, in response to an effort to
defeat a hostile bid for control of Wachovia Corporation, the
legislature restricted a shareholder's ability to call a shareholder
meeting. Both amendments reflect a decision to defer to the lobbying
efforts or other pressure by special interest promoting management
control of corporations," rather than an examination of the
overriding corporate governance implications of these changes in the
law.
Concerns over management control of corporations are not new.
For example, in their classic analysis of American corporations, 2
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means pointed out that "in the corporate
system, the 'owner' of industrial wealth is left with a mere symbol of
ownership while the power, the responsibility and the substance
which have been an integral part of ownership in the past are being
transferred to a separate group in whose hands lies control. '13 While
11. Traditional corporate governance structure and its separation of powers between
shareholders, directors, and managers creates a system of checks and balances. Managers
are permitted to run the day-to-day affairs of the corporation under the supervision and
direction of the board of directors. The directors are elected by, and are therefore
accountable to, the shareholders. Even beyond this electoral system, shareholder votes
are required for various actions, including most fundamental changes in the corporate
entity such as a merger with another corporation or dissolution. Shareholders are also
permitted to vote on substantive amendments to the articles of incorporation. The
amendments to the North Carolina Business Corporation Act, discussed herein, lessen the
shareholders' influence and thus expand management control of corporate activities.
12. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (discussing the separation of corporate ownership from
control of the enterprise).
13. Id. at 68. For more recent attacks on corporate concentration in America, see, for
example, JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 257-279 (1977);
RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 15-32 (1976); and
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF
CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 74-121 (1975). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and
1900 [Vol. 80
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corporate management needs the flexibility to make business
decisions to manage effectively, this does not mean that shareholders
should be divested of the residual control of the corporate enterprise.
Even though modem corporate statutes have increased
management control, they still recognize the importance of
shareholder voting. As a result of the long-held tradition of corporate
law in this country, major matters of corporate governance must be
put to a shareholder vote. The shareholders, for example, have
control over the corporate charter 14  except for ministerial
amendments, such as a corporate name change. The procedure for
amending the articles of incorporation requires that the board of
Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 24-59 (2001) (discussing the propriety of regulating the
separation of shareholder ownership and actual control of the corporation).
Other commentators have applauded this separation of control from ownership.
See generally THE ATrACK ON CORPORATE AMERIcA: THE CORPORATE ISSUES
SOURCEBOOK (M. Bruce Johnson ed., 1978) (compiling essays on such topics as the
corporate social role, management, state and federal chartering and the economic
market); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996) (analyzing shareholders' role
in corporate governance and arguing against separation of ownership from control);
Henry G. Manne, The "Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
399 (1962) (criticizing various schools of thought relating to the separation of ownership
from control); Bayless Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General
Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 38 (1960) (arguing that the
practice of corporate control and individual ownership is not as problematic as others have
claimed).
For a general discussion of corporate social responsibility, see, for example, Phillip
I. Blumberg, Selected Materials on Corporate Social Responsibility, 27 Bus. LAw. 1275
(1972) (providing a bibliography of sources). See also Cary Jones, Note, The Modem
Corporation Looks Homeward: The Berle and Means Revolution and the Corporate
Paradigm, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 471, 477-82 (discussing the relevance of the ideas of Berle
and Means in today's society). See generally David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate
Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979) (addressing the theory of corporate social
responsibility as a backdrop of political philosophy); Edwin M. Epstein, Societal,
Managerial, and Legal Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and
Process, 30 HASTINGs L.J. 1287 (1979) (providing a framework for the social responsibility
concept); Thomas L. Hazen & Bren L. Buckley, Models of Corporate Conduct: From the
Government Dominated Corporation to the Corporate Dominated Government, 58 NEB. L.
REV. 100 (1978) (examining corporate regulation through the views of various corporate
commentators); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1265 (1998) (criticizing the "law-as-price theory" and its lack
of consideration for social responsibility).
14. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-10-03, 55-10-04
(2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §§ 10.03, 10.04 (1999).
15. Under the law of many states, the board of directors may amend the articles of
incorporation to extend the duration of a limited existence corporation, delete the names
and addresses of the initial directors, delete the name and address of the original
registered agent if a successor agent has been duly selected, authorize a stock split if the
corporation has only one class of shares outstanding and change the corporate name. E.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-02 (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACr § 10.05 (1999).
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directors adopt a proposed amendment, which is then presented to
the shareholders at a shareholder meeting for approval by a majority
of the shares entitled to vote.16 Other organic changes, such as
mergers, 7 sales of substantially all of the assets other than those in
the regular course of business, 8 and dissolutions,19 similarly require
that a majority of the shares entitled to vote approve the proposed
change. In addition, shareholders are vested with control over the
board of directors by virtue of having the power to elect 0 and
remove2' directors. Shareholder democracy not only has been a
benchmark of state corporate law,2 it has been further strengthened
by federal securities law in the case of public corporations. 
3
The basic rules of corporate governance, thus, are found in the
laws of a company's state of incorporation. Over time, state
legislatures have struggled to strike the proper balance between the
often competing interests of shareholders and management. North
Carolina's tradition is filled with a rich history of safeguarding the
shareholders' role in corporate governance. In 2001, however, the
North Carolina General Assembly departed from this important
tradition for the sake of expediency and, in doing so, undermined two
important concepts of shareholder rights.
16. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-10-03, 55-10-04
(2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr §§ 10.03 (1999).
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-11-01, 55-11-03 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT §§ 11.01,
11.03 (1999).
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-12-02 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 12.02 (1999).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-14-02 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 14.02 (1999).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-03 (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03(d) (1999).
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-08 (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.08 (1999).
22. The law of the state of incorporation governs the internal affairs of the
corporation, including its governance rules. See, e.g., 1 Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra
note 6, §§ 2.5, 2.6 (discussing the "internal affairs" doctrine); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew
T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 961-
62 (2001) (noting the corporation's ability to choose the applicable law by incorporating in
a given state).
Federal securities law supplements state law with investor protection rules. See,
e.g., 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§§ 1.2(2)-1.3(C) (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION]
(recounting the development of the federal securities laws).
23. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets:
Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis.
L. REV. 391, 397-40 (1978) [hereinafter Hazen, Corporate Chartering] (discussing the
relationship of state and federal law affecting shareholder voting rights and procedures);
Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 218-25 (1999)
(discussing federal preemption of state corporate law).
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II. NORTH CAROLINA TRADITIONS
Since the adoption of its modernized corporation act in 1955,24
North Carolina was in the vanguard of protecting shareholder rights.5
In 1986, however, the North Carolina legislature began cutting back
piecemeal on shareholder fights. 6  As discussed herein, this
unfortunate trend has continued.
In 1986, the legislature limited the fight of shareholders of a
public corporation to mandate a special meeting of shareholders to
24. Although adopted in 1955, the act was not effective until 1957. Therefore, it is
referred to as the Business Corporation Act of 1957. See ROBINSON, supra note 4,
§ 1.02(a), at 1-4.
25. See, e.g., Ernest L. Folk III, Revisiting the North Carolina Corporation Law: The
Robinson Treatise Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered, 43 N.C. L. REV. 768, 805-33
(1965). In addition, see Thomas Lee Hazen, Book Review of North Carolina Corporation
Law and Practice Revised Third Edition by Russell M. Robinson II, 61 N.C. L. REV. 1256,
1259 (1983), which relies on RUSSELL M. ROBINSON II, NORTH CAROLINA
CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 2-3 (rev. 3d ed. 1983) to set forth the following
protectionist provisions of the North Carolina statute:
1. statutory requirement that one-third of the corporate earnings be paid out in
dividends upon demand by the holders of at least twenty percent of the shares
2. mandatory cumulative voting;
3. extensive mandatory voting rights to nonvoting shares;
4. extensive class voting rights and rights of appraisal given to preferred
shareholders upon any recapitalization designed to eliminate dividend arrearages
or effect other prejudicial changes;
5. other unusual rights of appraisal...;
6. strict nonfinancial limitations on a corporation's purchase of its own shares;
7. prohibition against shares redeemable at holder's option and against
convertibility into a senior security;
8. strict limitations on increases and decreases in number of directors;
9. limitations on employee compensation by stock and options;
10. relatively tight watered stock liability, particularly for promoters;
11. nonresident directors subject to the jurisdiction of local courts;
12. no security-for-expenses provision in derivative actions.
26. For example, in 1986, the legislature eliminated mandatory cumulative voting
rights and limited the shareholders' power to call special meetings. Act of June 26, 1986,
ch. 801, § 45, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 30,41 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-
28 (2001)); ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 1.02(a), at 1-5. In 1987, the legislature authorized a
provision in the articles of incorporation to excuse directors from liability in terms of
monetary damages for duty of care violations. Act of July 22, 1987, ch. 626, 1987 N.C.
Sess. Laws 1113 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2001)). The
legislature also adopted two anti-takeover statutes-the Shareholder Protection Act, ch.
88, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 84, amended by Act of May 1, 1987, ch. 124,1987 N.C. Sess. Laws
122 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9-01 to 55-9-05 (2001)), and the
Control Share Acquisition Act, ch. 182, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 205 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9A-01 to 55-9A-09 (2001)). For further discussion of these
legislative actions, see ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 1.02(a), at 1-6. See also Thomas Lee
Hazen, Corporate Directors'Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66
N.C. L. REV. 171,180-81 (1987) [hereinafter Hazen, Race to the Bottom].
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vote upon matters put forth in the call for the meeting.27 Until 1986,
the North Carolina statute provided that holders of ten percent of a
class of shares entitled to vote on a matter could mandate that a
special meeting of the shareholders be called. In 1986, the General
Assembly amended that provision, depriving shareholders of a public
corporation the right to mandate the call of a shareholder meeting
unless an enabling provision is included in the public company's
articles of incorporation or bylaws."' In the spring of 2001, pursuant
to the existing statute, SunTrust, the hostile bidder29 in the battle over
Wachovia, planned to introduce an amendment to Wachovia's bylaws
that would have given the right to call a special meeting to the owners
of ten percent of the shares entitled to vote.30  To thwart this
initiative, Wachovia and First Union convinced the North Carolina
General Assembly to change the corporate law to permit a provision
enabling the shareholders to call a special meeting only if authorized
by a public company's articles of incorporation, not by its bylaws, as
was formerly the case.3 The significance of this amendment to the
North Carolina Business Corporation Act is that it effectively
prevented the shareholders of a public corporation from enacting an
enabling provision to permit shareholders to mandate a special
shareholders' meeting. This dilution of shareholder power was the
consequence of the legislative change because shareholders only have
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02(a) (2001) (amended 2002). For example, the 1986
legislation rearranged existing shareholder rights by limiting the shareholders' initiative.
For, as of that date, shareholders no longer automatically had the right to mandate a
shareholder meeting; it became necessary to first amend the bylaws. § 55-10-20.
Presumably the bylaw amendment would have to await the next annual shareholder
meeting or one called by the company's management. Although no such attack on the
1986 amendment has yet been made, it can be argued that, as applied to corporations
incorporated prior to the statute's amendment, the new limitation is an unconstitutional
interference with existing contract rights. Nelson Ferebee Taylor, Evolution of Corporate
Combination Law: Policy Issues and Constitutional Questions, 76 N.C. L. REv. 687, 992-
1010 (1998).
28. Act of June 26, 1986, ch. 801, § 44, 1986 N.C. Sess. Laws 30, 40 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2001)).
29. A hostile bidder bids for corporate control without the blessing of the target
company's management. Thus, SunTrust was a hostile bidder in the context of the
Wachovia merger, while First Union was a friendly suitor.
30. This plan was revealed in a filing that SunTrust made with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. See Tom Shean, New N.C. Law Tilts Merger War Against
Suntrust, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), June 15, 2001, at D-1, available at 2001
WL 9721991.
31. Act of June 14,2001, ch. -, § 15,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws -, - (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02(a) (2001)), available at http:llwww.ncleg.netlSessionLaws/2001_/
sl20010201/default.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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the ability to propose amendments to the bylaws,32 not the articles of
incorporation.3 In the wake of the 2001 legislation, SunTrust was
disabled from introducing the proposed bylaw amendment, which, as
a result of the new law, could only be introduced as an amendment to
the articles requiring the imprimatur of Wachovia's board of
directors. 4
The legislation was patently geared to the SunTrust takeover.
Although other unrelated amendments to the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act were to become effective on October 1,
2001, the provision relating to the shareholders' ability to mandate a
special meeting was immediately effective,36  thus precluding
SunTrust's initiative. The effect of this hurried amendment, though,
went beyond the particular takeover battle for which it was crafted.
Consider, for example, a public corporation which, through its
bylaws, adopted such an enabling provision prior to the 2001
amendment to give the shareholders initiative to call a special
meeting. As enacted, the 2001 amendment to section 55-7-02(a)
would appear to void such a bylaw. The new legislation, if upheld37 as
applied to an existing corporation, would be an unwarranted
interference with existing corporate governance structures.38
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-20 (2001) (providing for the amendment of bylaws by
directors or shareholders). This provision follows MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20
(1999).
33. Section 55-10-03 (2001) of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides that
when the articles are to be amended by shareholder action, the amendment must come in
the form of a recommendation from the board of directors before it is submitted to the
shareholders.
34. See, e.g., David Boraks, Battle for Wachovia: One Day Wonder: N.C. Gov Signs
1st Union's Law, AM. BANKER, June 15, 2001, at 2, available at 2001 WL 3912258
(discussing the effect of the new legislation); Chris Serres, House Deals Blow to Bid by
SunTrust, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 14,2001, at D1, available at 2001 WL
3469487 (same); David Rice, Banks' Merger Gets a Boost; State Pre-empts SunTrust
Strategy, WINSTON-SALEM J., June 15, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 19803835 (same);
David Rice, First Union Asks for Legislative Aid in Takeover: Bank Says SunTrust has
Unfair Advantage, Wants to Change the Rules, WINSTON-SALEM J., June 13, 2001, at 1,
available at 2001 WL 19803740 (same).
35. Thus, one observer referred to it as "1st Union's Law." See Boraks, supra note 34.
36. Act of June 14, 2001, ch. _, § 17, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws _, __, available at
http:llwww.ncleg.netlSessionLaws2OOl_sl2OOlO2Ol/default. htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
37. There are limits on a legislature's ability to ipso facto amend existing contract
rights, including voting rights. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518,558
(1819). Professor Taylor's fine article amply demonstrates that retroactive application of
this provision, in the absence of a right of appraisal for dissenters, would likely be
unconstitutional as an interference with existing contract rights among the shareholders.
See Taylor, supra note 27, at 992-1010.
38. To the extent that limitations of shareholder rights can be justified on policy
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Prior to the special First Union legislation described above, the
legislature enacted a provision permitting corporate articles of
incorporation to authorize shareholder action by a majority of the
shares entitled to vote without a formal meeting.39 Permitting the
majority of the shares to act outside the presence of the remaining
shareholders is troublesome in that it stifles the remaining
shareholders' voice. Also, for the reasons discussed below, the
majority consent provision further reflects the North Carolina
legislature's adherence to political expediency rather than thoughtful
consideration of corporate governance issues.4n
In contrast to the recent actions of the North Carolina General
Assembly, the North Carolina Supreme Court has long been
committed to safeguarding the rights of shareholders. For example,
one of the nation's leading cases on shareholder rights in closely held
corporations is the North Carolina decision in Meiselman v.
Meiselman.n1 Most recently, in First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks,
Inc.,.2 Judge Tennille recognized the importance of shareholders in
grounds, the usual argument is based on a contractarian analysis-namely, that the various
constituencies in the corporation should be free to provide contractually for the relative
rights and duties, even if that means dispensing with fiduciary obligations that traditionally
apply within the corporation. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and
Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 857-71 (1997) (reviewing LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL,
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995) and criticizing the contractarian paradigm);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Foreword, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law,
89 COLuM. L. REV. 1395 (1989) (discussing the extent to which corporations should be
allowed to opt out of corporate law by adopting charter provisions); Fred S. McChesney,
Comment, Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field. A Critique of Eisenberg,
89 COLuM. L. REV. 1530 (1989) (arguing that the contractarian paradigm preserves
freedom of choice while the fiduciary paradigm is "coercionist").
Because the 2001 amendments to section 55-7-02 of the General Statutes of North
Carolina unilaterally rearrange those existing contractual allocations of voting rights and
shareholder suffrage, they run counter to the argument that is generally used to support
backing corporate managers in control battles and other areas of corporate law.
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04 (2001) (appearing as amended).
40. I say this because the North Carolina statute applies only to nonpublic
corporations where the damage of such a provision is most likely to be recognized.
41. 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983) (protecting the reasonable expectations of
minority shareholders). For earlier treatment of duties in closely held corporations, see
generally Allen B. Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders:
A Model For Reform, 55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969), discussing the plight of minority
shareholders; and F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and
Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 875-78 (1978), advocating legislative reform
regarding closely held corporations.
42. 2001 WL 1885686 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001). The North Carolina Business
Court was created to allow parties to have their complex business disputes resolved by a
court with particular expertise in business law. For the history and evaluations of the
Business Court see Carrie A. O'Brien, Note, The North Carolina Business Court: North
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corporate governance by invalidating defensive takeover maneuvers
that would have had a coercive effect on a shareholder vote necessary
to approve the proposed transaction.43 The merger agreement
between First Union and Wachovia contained a number of provisions
designed to make a bid by a competing would-be acquirer unlikely to
succeed. Namely, the merger agreement contained a non-termination
clause that, in the court's words, would have "hobbled" Wachovia's
board in any attempt to combine with someone other than First
Union.' The North Carolina Business Court ruled that this clause
was unduly coercive in pushing the Wachovia shareholders to vote in
favor of the merger with First Union. In so ruling, unlike the
unfortunate recent actions of the North Carolina legislature, the
opinion upheld the supremacy of shareholder rights over the possible
self-interest45 of corporate managers.
In protecting the integrity of shareholders' voting rights, the
court in First Union noted the strong tradition of North Carolina's
corporate law,46 which includes the long-standing commitment to
shareholder rights.47 Fortunately, the North Carolina legislature's
Carolina's Special Superior Court for Complex Business Cases, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 367,
368-78 (2002).
43. Judge Tennille's opinion thoroughly analyzes all of the relevant Delaware cases.
44. First Union Corp., 2001 WL 1885686, at *38 ("In this case, if there had been a
proxy fight over seats on the Wachovia Board at the same time the merger proposal was
submitted, and SunTrust had elected a majority of directors, those new directors would
have been contractually hobbled .... ).
45. The possible self-interest in the First Union litigation arose out of the situation in
which Wachovia had agreed to be acquired in a friendly merger with First Union and then
was faced with an uninvited counter-offer by SunTrust Banks. The First Union/Wachovia
merger agreement submitted to the Wachovia shareholders for approval contained a "lock
out" provision under which there would have been a moratorium on mergers should the
shareholders reject the First Union proposal. The court found that this provision was
coercive in that it might encourage a shareholder to vote for the First Union deal on a
basis other than the merits or fairness of the transaction.
46. In a footnote commenting on the North Carolina legislature's decision to amend
section 55-8-30(d) to provide that "[t]he duties of a director weighing a change of control
situation shall not be any different, nor the standard of care any higher, than otherwise
provided in this section" (emphasis added), Judge Tennille observed:
Neither, the wisdom of that decision [to amend the statute] nor the legal and
economic debate over the nature of the corporation are within the purview of
this opinion. That North Carolina would adopt this social entity concept is not
surprising. The state's economic roots are sunk deep in the soil of textile,
furniture and tobacco companies that were historically run like families.
First Union Corp., 2001 WL 1885686, at *20 n.112 (citations omitted). See generally Lijun
K. Yang, Note, First Union v. Sun Trust Banks: The Fight for Wachovia and its Impact on
North Carolina Corporate Law, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 334 (2002) (providing an extensive
discussion of the First Union decision and the events leading up to it).
47. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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actions have not affected the ruling in the First Union case. The
business court's ruling thus reaffirms the long-held view that the
shareholder's right to vote is a "fundamental" right4" under the law
generally, and under the law of North Carolina in particular.
Unfortunately, as discussed below, recent legislation passed in
response to pro-management lobbying efforts has unduly weakened
this fundamental right.
III. THE EROSION OF SHAREHOLDERS' RIGHTS IN THE NORTH
CAROLINA BuSINESS CORPORATION AcT
As mentioned above, in 2001 the North Carolina General
Assembly continued eroding shareholder rights in the governance of
North Carolina corporations. The legislature hastily enacted the First
Union amendments that undermined the shareholders' ability to
mandate a special meeting of shareholders. It gave into the fierce
lobbying efforts from First Union to facilitate the merger with
Wachovia.49 The General Assembly derogated its responsibility to
maintain a more balanced corporate law. This legislation followed on
the heels of a measure permitting shareholder action without a
meeting for non-public North Carolina corporations.
A. Eliminating Shareholder Initiative-Law for Sale"°
In 2001, in the midst of a battle for control of Wachovia, the
North Carolina General Assembly rewrote the rules regarding the
convening of shareholder meetings. In the spring of 2001, First Union
and SunTrust were vying for control of Wachovia. Although
Wachovia and First Union had agreed on a plan of merger, SunTrust
wanted to present a counter-offer to the Wachovia shareholders. As
the battle unfolded, SunTrust, which had already acquired a stake in
Wachovia, planned to invoke its right under the general corporate
law to amend the bylaws to enable the holders of ten percent of a
class of voting shares to call a special meeting of shareholders.
SunTrust's plan was to give the Wachovia shareholders a chance to
express their preference for the SunTrust offer. The ability of ten
percent of the shares to call a special meeting is a long-standing
48. ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 7.01, at 7-1 to 7-3.
49. See Boraks, supra note 34.
50. Cf. 1 Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 2.6 (discussing the race of laxity);
Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 861, 862 (1969) (discussing the phenomenon of forum shopping for the state of
incorporation).
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bastion of shareholder democracy. As described above 15 in 1986 the
North Carolina General Assembly initially diluted that right for
shareholders of public corporations and further diluted it in 200152 to
block SunTrust's attempt to communicate with Wachovia's
shareholders. This act was such a blatant partisan legislative
intervention that it has been dubbed "1st Union's Law."53
The First Union amendment goes to the very core of corporate
democracy. Voting is an essential component of the package of
shareholder rights. 4 Corporate statutes generally precondition many
important corporate acts upon approval by a majority of the shares
entitled to vote. Additionally, shareholders have long been given
the right to air their views to management, even if the power to act on
the matter in question is solely vested in the board of directors.5 6 For
example, when shareholders have the ability to call a special meeting,
courts have held that informing the board of whom the shareholders
would recommend as president is a proper purpose for calling a
meeting, even though the power to select the president ultimately lies
within the purview of the board.5 7 The shareholders, thus, have a
right to have their concerns heard by corporate directors and
managers.
The shareholder role, however, extends beyond voting on
specified matters and having the ability to voice their concerns to
others. In many states, the ability to mandate a special meeting is
among the various rights of shareholder suffrage. For example, this
51. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
52. Act of June 14,2001, ch. _, § 15,2001 N.C. Sess. Laws __, - (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02(a) (2001)), available at http.//www.ncleg.nettSessionLaws/2001_/
sl20010201/default.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
53. See Boraks, supra note 34 (discussing the process by which the legislation was
passed).
54. See generally Hazen, Corporate Chartering, supra note 23 (detailing the effect of
the federal securities laws on corporate charters and shareholder suffrage); Kimble C.
Kannon & Patrick J. Tangney, Protection of Minority Shareholder Rights Under Delaware
Law: Reinforcing Shareholders as Residual Claimants and Maximizing Long-Term Share
Value by Restricting Directorial Discretion, 1995 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 725, 755 (1995)
(noting that voting rights should receive special protection); Wesley G. Nissen, The
Constitutionality of the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act's Voting Provisions, 1985 U.
ILL. L. REV. 647, 672 (1985) (recognizing that courts have characterized shareholder
voting rights as vested property rights).
55. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 144,253 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-10-03,
55-10-22, 55-14-02 (2001); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 601, 903 (McKinney Supp. 2001-
2002); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §§ 10.03, 10.06, 11.04, 11.06,12.02, 14.02 (1999).
56. See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954) (recognizing that
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statutory enabling provision for shareholder initiative is found in the
Model Business Corporation Act.5 8 This provision predated the 1980
revision to the Model Act and is firmly entrenched in American
corporate law. 9 The important right it secures was recognized in the
English Companies Act" and, by the late 1950s, many of the United
States adopted similar provisions.6
As of 2001, many states continued to statutorily grant the holders
of a stated percentage of the shares the right to call a special meeting
even in the absence of a bylaw conferring such a right.62 Other states,
including Delaware and New York, confer no such right without a
bylaw provision.63  Although the majority of statutes enable
shareholders to mandate a special meeting, obviously there is
disagreement as to whether this is a wise policy. While the evidence
points in the other direction, the North Carolina statute, as amended
in the spring of 2001, arguably may be a reasonable balance.'
58. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.02 (1999).
59. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-4-11(3) (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.10 to 608.12
(West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-702 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 29-132.2 (Michie 1932);
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 742(a) (West 1970); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 28 (2d
ed. 1971).
60. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 132 (Eng.); see, e.g., RALPH J.
BAKER & WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 178 (3d
unabridged ed. 1959). (noting the English Companies Act).
61. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2202 (Deering 1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-61(c) (1959)
(current version at § 55-7-02); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT CODE ANN. § 2.24(c) (Vernon 1980);
see BAKER & CARY, supra note 60, at 179. Delaware has continued to adhere to the
former American view that "special meetings of the stockholders may be called by the
board of directors or by such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of
incorporation or by the bylaws." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2001). There is no
mention of the shareholders' ability to mandate that a special meeting be called. Of
course, shareholders could be given this right in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws.
62. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-1248 (2001) (25% of a class of the votes); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 29-101.25(c) (2001) (20% of all outstanding shares entitled to vote); GA. CODE
ANN. § 14-2-702(d) (2001) (at least 25% of the voting power); HAW. REV. STAT. § 414-
122(a)(2) (2000) (amended 2002) (at least 10% of the votes entitled to be cast on any issue
proposed); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-702 (Michie 2001) (20% of the votes entitled to be cast on
any issue); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-29-2 (Michie 2001) (for corporations with fifty or fewer
shareholders, 25% of the shares entitled to vote on an issue); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B.7-020 (Michie 2001) (33 1/3% of the votes entitled to be cast on an issue); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12:73 (West 1994) (20% of the total voting power); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 362.044 (1997) (majority of the shares); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-655 (Michie 2001)
(corporations of thirty-five or fewer shareholders, 20% of all votes entitled to be cast on
any issue); WASH. REV. CODE § 24.06.100 (2001) ("persons having one-twentieth of the
votes entitled to be cast").
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 602(c) (McKinney
1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1056 (2002).
64. See, e.g., Chris Serres, New Law Hurts SunTrust / But It Limits Options for
Shareholders, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 15, 2001, at D1. (discussing the
process by which the legislation was passed).
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Although I disagree with the narrowing of shareholders' ability to
mandate a special meeting, this article does not elaborate on the
wisdom of the change. Rather, this article deals with the way in
which it was made.
The amendment was not designed to address shareholder voting
rights generally, but rather was clearly designed as an anti-takeover
maneuver.65 Although this essay was prompted by the action of the
North Carolina legislature, the problem is by no means unique to
North Carolina. A number of state legislatures similarly have blindly
acquiesced 66 in the desires of corporate management, rather than
balance the interests of shareholders.67 Although I do not agree that
the principles of fiduciary duty should yield to freedom of contract in
corporate law,' I do not take on that battle in this essay. Assuming
arguendo that the contractarians 69 are correct in their view that
fiduciary principles are outmoded and should be replaced by the
freedom of contract to define shareholder rights, lobbying the
legislature is not the means by which to accomplish that goal. In fact,
lobbying the legislature circumvents the shareholders' freedom of
contract by taking away their choice. The legislature's unilateral
rewriting of the governance rights embodied in a corporation's
charter not only violates freedom of contract principles, but it also
may be invalid under the Contract Clause of the United States
Constitution.70
65. The new law was designed "to protect [North Carolina companies] against abusive
tactics in unsolicited takeover attempts." Christine Van Dusen, SunTrust Wins One, Loses
One in Fight for Wachovia in North Carolina, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 15,2001, at 1G
(quoting First Union CEO Ken Thompson).
66. There are legitimate arguments that corporate statutes should give more leeway to
management and hence less protection to shareholders. See Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race
to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation
Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REv. 913,921-23 (1982); supra note 11.
67. For discussion of the politics underlying corporate legislative reform, see, for
example, Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV.
111, 122-23 (1987); Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8
CARDOZO L. REV. 709,721-22 (1987).
68. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention
in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REv. 961 (2001) (advocating the move to freedom of choice);
Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (And Market) Failure, and Moral
Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 293-95 (1991) [hereinafter Hazen, Corporate Persona]
(arguing that corporate contract and fiduciary duties are not incompatible); Hazen,
Corporate Chartering, supra note 23, at 397-440 (stating that too much regulation of
corporate conduct is unwise).
69. See supra note 13.
70. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10. See generally Taylor, supra note 27 (noting that statutory
amendments that have the effect of rearranging rights within existing corporations are
problematic at best and, if applied without appraisal rights being accorded to dissenters,
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The constitutional concern, however, is not the sole problem
with the new rules for shareholders' convening of meetings. There is
a substantive incoherence to the new provision. The substantive
incoherence is that shareholders of a publicly held company still can
mandate a special meeting if they cross the twenty percent share
ownership threshold.7 This provision is part of the Control Share
Acquisition Act that the General Assembly adopted in 1986 as an
anti-takeover device.7' This epitomizes irony, considering that the
only remaining guaranteed initiative for shareholders of a publicly-
held North Carolina company is found in a statute designed to
disenfranchise shareholders acquiring a substantial percentage of a
company's shares.
The 2001 change to the special shareholder meeting provisions of
the North Carolina statute was not made in response to a reasoned
debate over the wisdom of shareholder initiative, nor was it made
upon the recommendation of the General Statutes Commission73 or
the North Carolina Bar Association, which have both been active in
initiating corporate law reform over the past two decades. The
change was a direct result of First Union's lobbying efforts to help
defeat SunTrust's hostile offer. First Union asserted that its proposal
to acquire Wachovia would serve the state of North Carolina by
keeping the corporate headquarters at home and by preserving the
Wachovia name.74 First Union contended that, based on SunTrust's
past record of acquisitions, a similar result could not be expected to
follow a SunTrust takeover of Wachovia.75  The First Union
amendment was proposed to the legislature as a good faith attempt to
likely to be unconstitutional).
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9A-01(b)(2), 55-9A-03 (2001). This right to trigger a
special meeting is pointed out, for example, in ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 8.02, at 8-2 to 8-
3.
72. See supra notes 27-28; see also Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note
10, at 85-88 (discussing the background of the North Carolina Control Share Acquisition
Act).
73. The General Statutes Commission periodically reviews and recommends
legislation to be adopted. The Commission is a division within the North Carolina
Department of Justice designed to work with state officials and the legislature in reviewing
and drafting legislation. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-9 (2001). The members of the General
Statutes Commission decide which legislation they want to review. The Commission,
which works with the Attorney General's office from time to time, appoints drafting
committees when the Commission members believe legislation is warranted. The North
Carolina Business Corporation Act that was adopted in 1990 was drafted by such a
committee. I served as a member of this drafting committee. See infra note 90.
74. For a more complete description of the machinations behind this legislation, see
Yang, supra note 46, at 348-52.
75. Yang, supra note 46, at 348-52.
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thwart a threatened hostile bid that the drafters believed would be
contrary to the best interests of Wachovia shareholders and the state
of North Carolina. 6 I do not question the legitimacy of the concern
that First Union's bid may have been in the state's best interests. I
do, however, condemn the way in which the North Carolina
legislature tipped the balance in the takeover contest by amending its
corporate law. I am also concerned about state legislatures'
propensity, in general, to react favorably to management's concerns
and to unduly devalue the rights of shareholders. 7
76. Section 55-7-02 as it existed prior to the First Union amendment, would have
permitted First Union to amend Wachovia's bylaws to permit the call of a special meeting
by a delay of thirty days before the call for a special shareholder meeting and the
convening of the meeting. The resulting delay would have been a serious threat to First
Union's merger plans. As explained by Russell Robinson, a leading authority on North
Carolina Corporate law:
SunTrust took unfair advantage of these circumstances by putting on the agenda
a proposal to add a 30-day special meeting provision to Wachovia's bylaws, with
the promise of demanding such a meeting to elect directors who would negotiate
a SunTrust merger if the First Union merger was defeated. This was a snare and
delusion. It threatened to add to the proxy material a confusing distraction
calculated to draw the shareholders' attention away from the relative merits of a
First Union merger vs. [sic] a possible later SunTrust bid and to capture anti-
merger votes on a misleading basis. On its face, a proposal that appears to
broaden shareholder rights is "motherhood and apple pie." Thus, a significant
number of shareholders who would favor the merger would nevertheless be
likely simply to sign the SunTrust proxy as a vote for the special meeting
proposal, without knowing how, or taking the trouble, to split their vote and
without realizing the inappropriateness of the 30-day provision and the false
hope of the SunTrust board-packing proposal. (Incidentally, a Wall Street
Journal article at that very time explored the usually disastrous consequences of
such board-packing attempts.)
Letter from Russell M. Robinson II, Attorney, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, to Thomas
L. Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law 3 (July 9,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
In order to avoid this problem, at First Union's behest, a bill was introduced and
eventually enacted so as to eliminate Sun Trust's ability to amend the bylaws and call a
special meeting. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
In 2002, the legislature again amended section 55-7-02 to eliminate the thirty-day
delay and further fix the problems created by the hasty First Union amendments that had
been added. See Act of Aug. 1, 2002, ch. -, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws _, _ (now
available in leaflet form as Session Law 2002-58) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); infra notes 78-80. While the thirty-day delay may have been an unwise provision
in the statute, it was wrong to let First Union avoid this provision by special legislation
rather than wait for better thought-out remedial legislation such as that which was
introduced in 2002.
77. In the 1980s, the North Carolina legislature overturned years of forward-looking
corporate regulation when it overreacted to management's concerns of liability exposure
to shareholders for corporate mismanagement. See Hazen, Race to the Bottom, supra note
25, at 180-83 (discussing the changes to the North Carolina Corporation Act).
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The haste with which the General Assembly enacted the First
Union amendments is further demonstrated by the fact that in 2002
an amendment was enacted to reinject more balance into the law.
78
The most recent change to section 55-7-02 eliminated the substance of
the First Union Amendments and reinstated the ability of public
corporations to provide for shareholder initiative in their bylaws as
well as in the articles of incorporation. Section 55-7-02 as amended
provides that the right of shareholders to call a special meeting is
limited to corporations that are not public corporations.79 Section 55-
7-02(a)(1) as amended, however, also permits the call of a special
meeting by "the person or persons authorized to do so by the articles
of incorporation or bylaws."80  This would be accomplished by
allowing all corporations (public and nonpublic) to name in its bylaws
or articles of incorporation the persons entitled to call a special
meeting. Thus, for example, even a public corporation could amend
its bylaws to permit the call of a special meeting upon a petition of the
holders of a stated percentage of the shares. With the adoption of the
2002 amendments, the 2001 First Union amendment is in essence
eliminated from the laws of North Carolina. This episode, however,
leaves the indelible imprint of a short-lived statute that served its
intended goal-defeating SunTrust's challenge to the First
Union/Wachovia merger.
The method by which the legislature adopted the First Union
amendments presents two issues. A first concern is whether a state
legislature should intervene in a contest for corporate control to favor
one side and thus take the decision away from the owners of the
corporation-its shareholders. A second concern is whether, even
assuming that intervention in a particular corporate control battle is
appropriate, a wholesale amendment of the corporate statute is the
proper way to proceed. Instead, the legislation should specifically
target the acquisition in question.
With respect to the first issue, a major tenet of corporate law in
this country since its inception has been that the state should not
intervene in the management of private corporations. This policy has
78. H.R. 1503, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2002) (legislative proposal to
amend N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02). The amendment was passed on June 18, 2002, and
became law on August 1, 2002. Act of Aug. 1, 2002, ch. _, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws _,
- (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02) (now available in leaflet form as Session
Law 2002-58) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
79. Act of Aug. 1, 2002, ch. _, § 1, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws __,___ (now available in




appeared in various forms. Although the state of incorporation
through its corporation laws sets various management norms and
governance procedures, these norms are general ground rules rather
than directives for specific corporate decisions. Under the universally
recognized business judgment rule,81 which is nearly two centuries
old,82 courts defer to corporate managers' business judgment. Courts
will defer to corporate decisions even if those judgments are not
economically in the best interests of the corporation.8 3 Thus, courts
do not put themselves in the position of making business decisions.
This sound doctrine strongly militates against the state-whether
through its legislature or through its courts-from interfering in
business decisions of corporate management and shareholders. Prior
to the SunTrust bid, North Carolina's long-declared legislative policy
was to grant to ten percent of the shares entitled to vote on an issue
the right to compel a special meeting of the shareholders. 84 By
amending the statute, the legislature disenfranchised the shareholders
of Wachovia and deprived them of the right to decide what was best
for themselves and their company. The legislature made this move
merely to favor one company, without any disengaged consideration
of the wisdom of reversing this long-held public policy of refraining
from intervening in management, . These events illustrate the old
adage that "hard facts make bad law."'85 Unfortunately, this episode
is not the first time that the North Carolina legislature has embarked
on this misguided journey.86
81. See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusINESS JUDGMENT RULE:
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998) (discussing in part the
application of the business judgment rule to corporate takeovers, shareholder derivative
suits, and indemnification and insurance of corporate officials); 1 COX, HAZEN &
O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 10.2 (discussing the business judgement rule); HARRY G.
HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (3d ed. 1983) (stating the
general rule and citing cases from various jurisdictions).
The failure to make an adequate investigation has been held to preclude the
applicability of the business judgment rule. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del.
1985).
82. See Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68 (La. 1829).
83. The classic example of this is Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968), where the management of the Chicago Cubs decided to remain the only major
league baseball team not to have night baseball games. Night baseball games produced
demonstrably higher revenues than daytime games. Id. at 780. Although the court noted
that most reasonable directors acted differently, it nevertheless deferred to the decision of
the Cub's directors. Id. at 781.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02 (1999) (amended 2001 & 2002).
85. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holes, J.,
dissenting) ("Great cases like hard cases make bad law.").
86. In the mid-1980s, a Canadian national made a takeover bid for Burlington
Industries, which, although incorporated in Delaware, had a substantial presence in North
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Notably, relatively few public corporations are organized under
the North Carolina Business Corporation Act. As such, this most
recent limitation on shareholder initiative will have limited practical
impact, unless there is a significant increase in the number of North
Carolina public corporations. This amendment may in fact inhibit
growth in the number of public corporations in North Carolina, as the
absence of shareholder initiative may make North Carolina less
attractive as a state of incorporation. Institutional investors
throughout the country have become increasingly proactive in
corporate governance.' The shareholders' ability to initiate a bylaw
amendment to grant shareholders the right to call a special meeting
may make the corporation more attractive to institutional investors.
Though the 2001 amendments to the statute may have only limited
impact in the future, this does not change the reality that the
legislation was ill-advised and should be reconsidered. In fact, the
leading treatise on North Carolina Corporate Law suggested that
further amendment of the North Carolina statute was needed to
accord shareholders of a public corporation "a reasonable right to call
a special meeting."'
B. Shareholder Action Without a Meeting
The earlier change in shareholder voting is the new provision
permitting corporations to opt into a system of shareholder action by
consent, thus dispensing with shareholders' meetings. 9 The drafting
Carolina. To defeat this bid, a bill was introduced in the North Carolina legislature to
create takeover barriers for corporations, which, although incorporated elsewhere, had
more than 50% of their assets and employees within the state. While the bill was
progressing to passage, it was discovered that Burlington did not meet this threshold and
the threshold was lowered to 40% in the state before the bill was enacted into law. See
Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 10, at 85. The history of this legislation
made it patently clear that it was geared to defeat a particular takeover bid. For my
previous criticism of the legislature's knee-jerk response to management-based lobbying
efforts, see Hazen, Race to the Bottom, supra note 26, at 84-88.
87. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United
States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAvE DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 827-29 (1992); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Liquidity Versus Control The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 COLtJM. L.
REv. 1277, 1291 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447 (1991); Roberta Romano, Less is
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate
Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 175 (2001); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795,799 (1993).
88. RUSSELL M. ROBINSON II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION
LAW § 8.3 (Supp. 2002).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04 (2001).
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committee 9° for the 1990 North Carolina Business Corporation Act
considered but rejected the Delaware approach of permitting
shareholder action by majority consent.91 Then, in 2001, the North
Carolina legislature reversed this position by permitting nonpublic
companies to adopt a majority consent provision through an
amendment to the articles of incorporation approved by the
shareholders.9
A corporation cannot dispense with a shareholder meeting under
the majority consent provision with respect to the election of
directors at the annual shareholders meeting.93 Majority consent,
however, can be invoked to avoid meeting for all other important
shareholder action, including amendments to the articles of
incorporation, mergers, and dissolution-all of which can take place
at a special shareholders meeting.94 Furthermore, since there is no
mention of the vacancy having to be filled at an annual shareholder
meeting95 the majority consent provision can also be used to fill
director vacancies at a special shareholder meeting. With an enabling
provision in the corporation's articles of incorporation, a majority
consent provision may thus be used for virtually any significant
corporate action requiring shareholder approval.
The legislative amendment that introduced the majority consent
provision to North Carolina was drafted by the Business Section of
90. The drafting committee, established by the North Carolina General Statutes
Commission, was chaired by Russell M. Robinson II and included Micheal R. Abel, Doris
R. Bray, Clarence W. Walker, Professor James D. Cox, and me. See ROBINSON, supra
note 4, § 1.02(b), at 1-6 to 1-7.
91. See ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 8.12, at 8-18 to 8-20 (discussing shareholder action
without a meeting).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04 (2001).
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04(al) (2001) provides that unanimous consent is
required to dispense with election of directors at the annual stockholders meeting.
In Hoschett v. TSI Int'l Software, Ltd., 683 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1996), the Chancery
Court held that, given the importance of the annual meeting to corporate governance,
action by written consent is not the equivalent of an annual meeting and ordered an
annual meeting to be held. Delaware subsequently amended section 211 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law to provide that an annual meeting need not be held if action is
taken without a meeting by less than unanimous consent. all directorships to which
directors could be elected at the annual meeting are vacant and all of those directorships
are filled by such action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (2001). This is in contrast to the
North Carolina statute which takes the better view that the annual meeting is sacrosanct
and cannot be avoided by majority consent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04(al) (2001).
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-10(a)(1) (2001).
95. Id. Director vacancies include those resulting from newly created director
positions. Id. This permits a majority of the shareholders to change the board's
composition by consent rather than waiting for the next annual meeting of shareholders.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the North Carolina Bar Association 96 and was supported by the
Business Section and the Bar Association as a whole. The Bar
Association's amendment was the result of the concern that venture
capital firms find such a provision attractive and that enabling North
Carolina corporations to adopt majority consent provisions would
encourage these companies to remain incorporated in North Carolina
rather than reincorporate in Delaware which permits shareholder
action by majority consent.9 8  The Business Section of the Bar
Association believed that amending the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act would benefit the state by preventing
reincorporation in Delaware. As well intentioned as this may have
been, the amendment was inspired by and focused on only a very
small percentage of North Carolina corporations-those seeking
venture capital financing. At the same, time the majority consent
provision operated to the detriment of minority shareholders99 in all
other nonpublic companies by permitting the elimination of
shareholder meetings for most important shareholder action.
The new North Carolina law on shareholder action by consent
raises two problems for existing corporations: (1) the prospect of
having to offer appraisal rights to dissenting shareholders; and (2) the
wisdom and fairness of permitting action by majority consent.
1. The Appraisal Remedy
As a result of the 2001 amendment to section 55-7-04 of the
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, any existing corporation
seeking to permit shareholder action by majority consent must submit
the matter to a shareholder vote at a duly convened meeting, as this is
the only way to amend the articles."° Such an amendment should
trigger statutory appraisal rights in the hands of dissenting
shareholders.
96. See Letter from Russell M. Robinson II, supra note 76; Letter from Stephen M.
Lynch, Attorney, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, to Thomas L. Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law (July 10,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
97. Email from Stephen M. Lynch, Attorney, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, to
Thomas L. Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law (July 29,2002,09:29:50 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
98. See Letter from Stephen M. Lynch, supra note 96.
99. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
100. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-10-03 to 55-10-04 (2001) (setting forth the procedure
for amending the articles).
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Statutory appraisal rights provide an exit for shareholders who
are dissatisfied with major corporate actions, including mergers and
specified important changes to the corporation's articles of
incorporation.1 1 Every state has adopted statutory appraisal rights
for some corporate actions.10 In essence, the statutory appraisal
101. The North Carolina appraisal remedy statute reads:
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9, a shareholder is entitled to
dissent from, and obtain payment of the fair value of his shares in the event of,
any of the following corporate actions:
(1) Consummation of a plan of merger to which the corporation (other than a
parent corporation in a merger whose shares are not affected under G.S. 55-11-
04) is a party unless (i) approval by the shareholders of that corporation is not
required under G.S. 55-11-03(g) or (ii) such shares are then redeemable by the
corporation at a price not greater than the cash to be received in exchange for
such shares;
(2) Consummation of a plan of share exchange to which the corporation is a
party as the corporation whose shares will be acquired, unless such shares are
then redeemable by the corporation at a price not greater than the cash to be
received in exchange for such shares;
(2a) Consummation of a plan of conversion pursuant to Part 2 of Article 11A
of this Chapter;
(3) Consummation of a sale or exchange of all, or substantially all, of the
property of the corporation other than as permitted by G.S. 55-12-01, including a
sale in dissolution, but not including a sale pursuant to court order or a sale
pursuant to a plan by which all or substantially all of the net proceeds of the sale
will be distributed in cash to the shareholders within one year after the date of
sale;
(4) An amendment of the articles of incorporation that materially and
adversely affects rights in respect of a dissenter's shares because it (i) alters or
abolishes a preferential right of the shares; (ii) creates, alters, or abolishes a right
in respect of redemption, including a provision respecting a sinking fund for the
redemption or repurchase, of the shares; (iii) alters or abolishes a preemptive
right of the holder of the shares to acquire shares or other securities; (iv)
excludes or limits the right of the shares to vote on any matter, or to cumulate
votes; (v) reduces the number of shares owned by the shareholder to a fraction of
a share if the fractional share so created is to be acquired for cash under G.S. 55-
6-04; or (vi) changes the corporation into a nonprofit corporation or cooperative
organization; or
(5) Any corporate action taken pursuant to a shareholder vote to the extent
the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or a resolution of the board of directors
provides that voting or nonvoting shareholders are entitled to dissent and obtain
payment for their shares.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02 (2001). There are exceptions to the appraisal remedy for
mergers and other business combinations, as well as for corporations whose shares are
listed on a national securities exchange or traded in Nasdaq's over-the-counter market,
where there are at least 2000 record shareholders. § 55-13-02(c) (listing the exceptions to
the appraisal remedy).
102. See 3 Cox, HAZEN & O'NEAL, supra note 6, at § 22.24 (discussing state law
appraisal remedies).
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remedy gives dissenting shareholders a right to demand payment of
the fair value of their shares.10 3
Corporations that amend their articles of incorporation to permit
shareholders to act by majority consent deprive existing shareholders
of an important aspect of their voting rights. °4 The right of appraisal
provides minority shareholders, especially in closely held
corporations, with the opportunity to exit from what might otherwise
be an illiquid position.0 5
The appraisal statute applies, among other things, to an
amendment to the articles of incorporation that "limits the right of
the shares to vote on any matter."' 6 Permitting shareholder action by
majority consent eradicates the need for a shareholder meeting and
removes a shareholder's opportunity to vote and enjoy the other
rights that attach to voting rights, such as appraisal rights. Although
statutory appraisal rights are afforded to shareholders who cast a
dissenting vote, simply withholding consent is not the equivalent of
casting a positive vote.
103. See generally ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model
Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855 (1977)
(discussing dissenting shareholders' rights); ABA Committee on Corporate Laws,
Proposed Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act-Appraisal Rights, 54 Bus.
LAW. 209 (1998) (same); Richard M. Buxbaum, The Dissenter's Appraisal Remedy, 23
UCLA L. Rev. 1229 (1976) (same); Alfred F. Conard, Amendments of Model Business
Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights (Sections 73, 74, 80, and 81), 33 Bus. LAW.
2587 (1978) (same); Norman D. Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in
Fundamental Changes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 307 (1958) (same); Norman D.
Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 HARv. L. REV.
233, 234-44 (1931) (same); Peter V. Letsou, The Role of Appraisal in Corporate Law, 39
B.C. L. REV. 1121 (1998) (same); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy:
An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962) (same); Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1 (1995)
(same); Joseph L. Weiner, Payment of Dissenting Stockholders, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 547
(1927) (same); Angie Woo, Note, Appraisal Rights in Mergers of Publicly-Held Delaware
Corporations: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, and Something
B.L. UE., 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 719 (1995) (same).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(4)(iv) grants the appraisal remedy to shareholders
dissenting from an amendment to the articles of incorporation that "excludes or limits the
right of the shares to vote on any matter, or to cumulate votes ......
105. As the North Carolina Supreme Court observed in a leading case, "the illiquidity
of a minority shareholder's interest in a close corporation renders him vulnerable to
exploitation by the majority shareholders." Meiselman v. Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 291,
307 S.E.2d 551, 559 (1983). For discussion of the general problem, see generally J.A.C.
Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977) (analyzing
the vulnerability of shareholders in closely held corporations).
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(4)(iv) (2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13-
02(a)(4)(iv) (1998) (amended 1999).
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Attendance at a meeting provides the opportunity not only to
debate issues, but also to propose amendments to agenda items and
thereby vote on the amendments. The action by consent procedure
bypasses this process, thus effectively denying minority shareholders
the right to vote.107 The importance of the right to vote and dissent
extends beyond the right to participate in the debate that may take
place at the meeting.
While the appraisal right provides protection to shareholders in
corporations existing at the time the 2001 amendments were adopted,
appraisal rights do not apply to corporations formed after that date
that opt into the majority consent procedure in the corporation's
initial articles of incorporation. In a newly formed corporation, the
organizers can avoid appraisal rights by adopting action by majority
consent in their initial articles of incorporation. The articles of
incorporation are on file with the secretary of state and thus are
readily available to anyone buying into an existing corporation.
Those shareholders, therefore, take with notice of the consent
procedure and, as such, can be deemed to have consented to it.
Even the sponsors of the majority consent provision recognize
that there is an issue concerning the availability of statutory appraisal
rights for an article amendment opting in to majority consent for
existing North Carolina corporations. In July 2002, representatives of
the Business Section Council of the North Carolina Bar Association 08
submitted to the North Carolina General Assembly's Senate
Judiciary Committee a proposed amendment to section 55-13-02,9
that would have had the effect of eliminating shareholder appraisal
rights for an amendment to the articles of incorporation
implementing majority consent without a meeting pursuant to 55-7-
04(a).110 Recognizing that this would not simply be a technical
107. In the event that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02(a)(4)(iv) is interpreted not to grant
appraisal rights to an article's amendment implementing the majority consent provisions
of § 55-7-04, the appraisal remedy would nevertheless be required for all corporations
incorporated prior to 2001, when § 55-7-04 was adopted. See Taylor, supra note 27, at
991-1010 (analyzing the Constitutional implications of post-incorporation changes in a
state's corporate law concerning statutory appraisal rights).
108. The 2001 amendments to § 55-7-04 were drafted by members of the Business
Section of the North Carolina Bar Association and submitted to the North Carolina
General Assembly with the support of the Bar Association. See supra note 96.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02 (2001).
110. See Email from Stephen M. Lynch, Attorney, Robinson Bradshaw & Hinson, to
Thomas L. Hazen, Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North
Carolina School of Law (Aug. 10, 2002, 13:13:19 EST) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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correction, the proposal was withdrawn.' It thus remains to be the
case that the language of the appraisal rights statute"2 calls for
statutory appraisal rights upon the amendment of a corporation's
articles of incorporation to adopt a majority consent provision.'
2. Basic Fairness
My concern over the majority consent provision goes beyond the
appraisal remedy. Traditionally, corporate law required that all
shareholder action had to take place at duly convened shareholder
meetings."4 The only exception, which continues to be the case in
many states, was that holders of all of the shares entitled to vote may
act unanimously by written consent without a meeting. 5 An
increasing number of states led by Delaware, however, permit
shareholder action without a meeting by consent of a mere majority
of the shares entitled to vote." 6 This may be desirable for many
corporations where a shareholder meeting would be just a formality.
This is the case for most public corporations, where the need for a
meeting is further diminished in light of SEC mandated disclosure
requirements designed to keep investors informed."
7
Permitting action without a meeting in a closely-held context,
however, is not a desirable outcome. The rationale underlying the
requirement of a formal meeting is that it allows even minority
shareholders to voice their concerns and to have the opportunity to
influence the votes of their fellow shareholders."' A majority consent
111. Id.
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-13-02 (2001).
113. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
114. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-01 (2001) (annual meeting); id. § 55-7-02 (special
meeting); MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 7.01 (1999) (annual meeting); id. § 7.02 (special
meeting).
115. E.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-7.04 (1999); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.423 (Michie 2000);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 10-704 (1996); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-56-302 (2001); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-7-04 (1999) (amended 2001); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 7.04 (1999).
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2001); see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 603 (West
Supp. 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-704 (Michie 2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
698 (West Supp. 2002); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.0701 (West 2001); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/7.10 (West 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-6 (West Supp. 2002); TEX. BUS. CORP.
AcT CODE ANN. § 9.10 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
117. SEC Rule 14a-3 provides that when management solicits shareholder consent, it
must provide detailed information about the proposals being submitted. Even if the
company does not solicit consent, it must nevertheless provide shareholders with the same
type of information via an information statement that must be distributed in advance of
the date on which the action by consent is to be taken. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3.
118. See generally HAZEN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 22, § 10.8, at 136
(discussing the SEC shareholder proposal rule); Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting Corporate
Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal Proxy Rules on
1922 [Vol. 80
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provision eliminates minority owners' access to the decision-making
process. It is a relatively minor inconvenience and expense to solicit
minority shareholder proxies to permit a quorum without physical
attendance at a meeting." 9 At the same time, the formal meeting
leaves minority shareholders the option of attending in person. It is
difficult to see a valid reason for denying this option to minority
shareholders; after all, the shareholders' money has been used in
forming the business. Although a minority shareholder may not have
an effective voice, the ability to attend meetings gives shareholders
access to information that, as owners, they should have. The
shareholders' voice has been silenced and their right to information
derogated by the increasing number of states permitting shareholder
action by majority consent.
An additional problem with the majority consent provision, from
the perspective of minority shareholders, is that they will not be
informed of shareholder action by consent until after the action has
taken place.120 The lack of timely information opens the door for all
sorts of mischief. For example, dominant shareholders, although
alone they may lack a majority of the votes, can achieve working
control by soliciting the consent of the more malleable shareholders.
Dominant shareholders could therefore secure a majority without
consulting all of the remaining shareholders or giving them the
chance to speak to their fellow shareholders to make their case
against the position urged. It is not sufficient to say that the course of
events can be altered once the action by consent is announced.
Claiming that the course of events can be altered is insufficient. If the
corporation has already begun to implement the action in question, it
may be too late to turn back the clock and rescind the action
approved by majority consent without a meeting. Thus, for example,
Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 33 (1997) (discussing the SEC's shareholder
proposal rule and proposing reform that would preserve shareholder democracy); Eric A.
Welter, Note, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Change to Certainty, 60 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1980 (1992) (calling for federal legislation to clarify shareholders' access to the proxy
process in public issue corporations).
119. In the absence of a shareholder consent statute, the corporation must send
shareholders notice of a meeting. If corporations or shareholders want to solicit proxies,
they can do so by phone or other simple communication. The inconvenience and cost of
having a meeting thus is quite minor.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04(d) (2001) requires advance notice of mergers and
certain other shareholder action before the action by consent is taken. However, the
articles can be amended to eliminate such prior consent. Id. It is reasonable to assume
that a corporation adopting a majority consent enabling provision may also dispense with
the prior notice requirement of section 55-7-04(d).
2002] 1923
1924 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
this process would effectively eliminate the availability of injunctive
relief to stop the transaction from taking place.
The majority consent provision cannot totally preclude
shareholder meetings in nonpublic companies, because ten percent of
the shares entitled to vote can mandate a special meeting of the
shareholders under section 55-7-02 of the North Carolina Business
Corporation Act.121 This does not adequately address the concern
raised above, however, because once the action by consent is taken,
the only possible relief at a subsequent special meeting would be to
try to undo the action. As a practical matter, this may not be effective
as, under the terms of section 55-7-02(b) as enacted in 2001, the
corporation can delay the meeting for up to thirty days following the
written demand for a special meeting. 2 Furthermore, there may be a
time lag from the date the action by majority consent is taken and the
time that the action is disclosed to the non-consenting shareholders.
Although section 55-7-04(e) provides that nonconsenting
shareholders should receive notice of the action taken by consent
within ten days following the action taken, failure to give the notice
does not invalidate the action.'2 As a result, the majority can delay
any shareholder meeting for a significant period of time 124 following
the action by consent, and, as a practical matter, the delay could be
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02 (2001) (amended 2002); see supra notes 27-28 and
accompanying text.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02(a)(2) (2001) (amended 2002).
123. The statute states that:
If action is taken without a meeting by fewer than all shareholders entitled to
vote on the action, the corporation shall give written notice to all shareholders
who have not consented to the action and who, if the action had been taken at a
meeting, would have been entitled to notice of the meeting with the same record
date as the action taken without a meeting, within 10 days after the action is
taken. The notice shall describe the action and indicate that the action has been
taken without a meeting of shareholders. Failure to comply with the
requirements of this subsection shall not invalidate any action taken that
otherwise complies with this section.
§ 55-7-04(e). See supra note 120.
In the case of action by consent regarding a merger, share exchange, article
amendment, dissolution or other action that could trigger the statutory appraisal remedy,
the notice of the action by consent will have to include the notice required for statutory
appraisal rights. See § 55-7-04(d).
124. The forty day period is based on taking advantage of the ten day delay before
giving notice of the action and then, assuming there is an immediate demand for a special
meeting by the required ten percent of the shares, there would be an additional thirty days
under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-02(a)(2) (2001). In all likelihood the period would be
longer, since it would probably take some time for the non-consenting shareholders to
digest the information in the notice and then prepare and deliver the written demand for a
special meeting.
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extended for a considerably longer period.115 Therefore, by the time a
special meeting is called, it may be too late to "unscramble the eggs."
The North Carolina legislature's proclivity to respond to
lobbying efforts rather than engage in thoughtful analysis was
reflected in the 2001 amendment that defeated shareholder initiative
in public corporations. 26 It is also reflected in the majority consent
provision of section 55-7-04. While I question the wisdom of such a
choice by closely held entities, the statute does make it something
that the corporation has to opt into, thus requiring at least
constructive consent of all of the shareholders. Applying principles of
freedom of contract to corporate law, although of questionable
wisdom127 is consistent with the current trend of corporate law
throughout the country. Ironically, the North Carolina legislature has
not left this option open to existing public corporations.1 8 By its
terms, section 55-7-04 applies to "a corporation that is not a public
corporation at the time the action is taken .... " Thus, unlike
Delaware, 29 public corporations incorporated in North Carolina
cannot take advantage of majority shareholder consent, unless it was
provided for in the initial articles or adopted as an amendment to the
articles before the corporation became public. Why make such a
distinction? Presumably the distinction exists because the legislature
wanted to insulate the few existing public North Carolina
corporations from having a hostile takeover attempt aided by the
shareholder consent provision contained in their articles of
incorporation.1Y0
125. In addition to the likelihood that the permissible period would extend beyond
forty days, there could be a delay in giving notice of the action beyond the ten-day
statutory period that would not invalidate the action taken. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-7-04(e)
(2001).
126. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
127. See generally Hazen, Corporate Persona, supra note 68 (arguing against the
application of contract principles to destroy fiduciary obligations in corporate
governance).
128. "'Public corporation' means any corporation that has a class of shares registered
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (15 U.S.C. § 78)."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-40(18a) (2001). Presumably a non-public company could adopt
the article amendment and then become a public company with the amendment remaining
in force.
129. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2001).
130. Years ago Martin Marietta Corp. and Bendix Corp. were engaged in a takeover
involving the Pac-Man defense-an acquisition of an aggressor as a response to a hostile
bid. Cf. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982) (refusing
to enjoin defensive tactic). See generally Deborah A. De Mott, Comment, Pac-Man
Tender Offers, 1983 DuKE L.J. 116 (1983) (discussing the Pac-Man defense). Once the
competing suitors' purchases stopped, each company owned a majority of the other's
shares. The corporation that was not incorporated in Delaware won the battle. The
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CONCLUSION
In 2001, the North Carolina legislature took two unfortunate
steps towards silencing the shareholders' voice in the management of
corporations. This legislative action, however, was contrary to the
traditions of corporate law in this country and particularly in North
Carolina. The legislature should reconsider its decision to succumb to
the political lobbies of corporate managers at the expense of the
shareholders and investors who put up their capital to finance these
corporate entities. Even if the legislature does not take corrective
action, the courts should continue to interpret the North Carolina
corporate law in light of the state's rich tradition of protecting
shareholder rights against management's possible self-interest. More
than thirty-five years ago, a preeminent authority on corporate law
identified the North Carolina corporate statute as "the most
advanced statute of its time." '131 The North Carolina legislature's
recent actions may cause the North Carolina Business Corporation
Act to be described as the most politically-motivated statute of its
time.32 It would be in the interest of the citizens of North Carolina to
restore our corporate law to the revered stature it formerly held. Let
us hope that the courts do not find themselves on the same slippery
slope as the legislature.
Delaware shareholder consent statute was partly responsible because it permitted
immediate shareholder action, whereas shareholders of the victorious corporation would
have had to call a special meeting, a process that takes weeks due to state law notice
requirements and the federal proxy requirements. The SEC disclosure requirements did
not slow the process since the controlling shareholder did not have to solicit other
shareholders' consent. The Delaware statute thus worked to the advantage of the
acquiring corporation. See Harry Anderson & Hope Lampert, Bendix Bites the Dust,
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 4, 1982, at 67.
131. Folk, supra note 25, at 769. Professor Folk further explained that the 1955 North
Carolina Corporation Act "was the forerunner of significant developments in corporation
laws elsewhere in the United States." Id.
132. As pointed out earlier, this is due not only to the current amendments but also to
a trend that was started a little more than ten years ago. See generally Hazen, Race to the
Bottom, supra note 26 (lamenting the state's derogation of corporate responsibility);
Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation, supra note 10 (discussing changes in state anti-
takeover legislation). These changes and others were incorporated into the 1990 Business
Corporation Act, which adopted a variation of the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act. See ROBINSON, supra note 4, § 1.02(b), at 1-6 to 1-7. As part of this legislation, the
legislature adopted the Model Act formula and eliminated an express reference to
fiduciary obligations in describing the duties of corporate directors. See Taylor, supra note
27, at 982-83. The North Carolina statute also permits a charter provision eliminating
director liability for certain breaches of fiduciary duty. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3)
(2001). It has been suggested, however, that there may be constitutional barriers to
implementing such a provision. See Taylor, supra note 27, at 982-84.
